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Can the threat of being shamed or the prospect of
being honoured lead to greater cooperation? We
test this hypothesis with anonymous six-player
public goods experiments, an experimental para-
digm used to investigate problems related to
overusing common resources. We instructed the
players that the two individuals who were least
generous after 10 rounds would be exposed to
the group. As the natural antithesis, we also test
the effects of honour by revealing the identities
of the two players who were most generous. The
non-monetary, reputational effects induced by
shame and honour each led to approximately
50 per cent higher donations to the public good
when compared with the control, demonstra-
ting that both shame and honour can drive
cooperation and can help alleviate the tragedy
of the commons.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Shame is a traditional deterrent from asocial behaviour
and is employed when offenders are singled out for
public scorn. The expectation of honour, on the
other hand, can reinforce prosociality. While honour
is conspicuous in society (e.g. the proliferation of
prizes), it is tempting to think of shame as a medieval
phenomenon, when the accused were placed in the
town pillory or emblazoned with a scarlet letter.
Modern democratic societies have moved away from
including the public in the punishment, although in
some cases (e.g. drunk driving licence plates) the
state still sanctions shame [1]. Furthermore, attention
in the form of shame as well as honour could become
more prevalent as digital technology increasingly
allows us to communicate and keep track of one
another. Here, we test experimentally whether the
fear of being shamed or the prospect of being hon-
oured provides an incentive to cooperate.
Social dilemmas arise through the consumption of
common resources, such as wild ﬁsh, fossil fuels or
clean water, and translate into a tragedy of the com-
mons, where group cooperation is undermined by
individual self-interest [2]. Public goods experiments
capture the tension between individual and group-
interest, and usually conﬁrm Hardin’s pessimistic
promise that ‘freedom in the commons brings ruin to
all’ [3]. In a typical set-up, players receive start-up capi-
tal and can choose to donate some or none of it to a
‘public goods’ project; donations are increased by a
given factor and redistributed evenly among all players,
irrespective of whether theycontributed. Maximum net
beneﬁt is achieved if all players donate, but individual
players earn most if they keep their capital and proﬁt
from the generosity of the other players. Usually players
inevitably exercise this ‘rational’ self-interest and
cooperation quickly declines.
Publicgoodsinteractionsalsoexemplifycooperation’s
intricacies. For instance, players are willing to pay to
punish uncooperative behaviour [4]. Experiments that
allow players to build and beneﬁt monetarily from repu-
tation lead to increased cooperation [5,6]. In games that
offer players anonymity, uncooperative behaviour is
more prevalent [7] while the opposite is true of games
in which players know that each of their decisions will
be linked to their real identities [8–10]. Revealing the
identities of all participants (e.g. [8–10]) corresponds
to full transparency but publicizing all identities does
not allow us to distinguish whether increased coopera-
tion is primarily due to the promise to expose low
contributors, high contributors or both. If players know
that only the least or most cooperative individuals are
to stand in front of their peers, will they cooperate
more as a group?
We designed this public goods experiment to isolate
the effects of being shamed or honoured, with no mon-
etary consequences to either experience, and test
whether the expectation of negative or positive reputa-
tional information enforces social behaviour. We
hypothesized that the threat of shame or the prospect
of honour would lead to increased public contri-
butions. We also expected that shame might be more
effective than honour because players would particu-
larly seek to avoid negative exposure, and therefore
contribute more to the public good.
2. MATERIAL AND METHODS
We tested our predictions with 180 ﬁrst-year University of British
Columbia science students divided into three treatments, shame,
honour and control, consisting of 10 identical six-player games each.
To foster indelibility of being shamed and honoured, all six players
came from the same class so that the players were acquainted with
each other. Players were recruited within the ﬁrst few weeks of the
term toensurethat they would meetagain repeatedly during theterm.
There was a single group of six players in the room at a time.
Players were partitioned off from each other as well as the exper-
imenters, who stayed out of view for the duration of the actual
experiment. Each player received a starting account of CDN$12
and a randomly assigned unique pseudonym (obscure Greek gods).
Players were anonymized, both to the experimenters and other
players, but players in the honour and shame treatments wrote real
names inside an envelope labelled with their pseudonym, which
was collected by the experimenter so the two least generous players
(or most generous in the honour treatment) could eventually be
identiﬁed. The box with the concealed names remained visible to
all players at all times to protect their anonymity. All six players
could see a public screen on which instructions and the game were
projected. Before the game, an experimenter read the instructions,
and demonstrated the choices and outcomes in example games
using pseudonyms not appearing in the experiment.
Players chosewhether tocontribute$1intoapublicpoolorkeepit
in his/her private funds at each round for 12 rounds. Without visual
contact with the player, an experimenter passed a locked box
into each cubicle, in which every player placed his/her anonymized
envelope (blank on the outside; pseudonym on the inside) containing
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After round 10, the experimenter opened the envelopes labelled
with the pseudonyms of the two players who donated least overall
in the shame treatments to reveal their real names (in the honour
treatment it was the two players who donated most). In the event
of a tie, the experimenter chose two players by throwing a six-sided
die, with the pseudonyms pre-determinedly linked to each number.
Ties occurred in ﬁve of the shame games and four of the honour
games. Interestingly, ties occurred only for the second least
(or most) generous players but never for the least (or most) generous
players. In addition, one game in the shame treatment resulted in
only one player being exposed because all ﬁve other players contrib-
uted 100 per cent. The two least generous players went in front of the
group and wrote their name on a board under the phrase ‘I donated
least’, which was visible for the entire game (for honour, the phrase
was ‘I donated most’ and the two most generous players went in
front). The real names of these two players were also added to the
pseudonyms on the public screen. The remaining four envelopes
with the names of the four players that retained their anonymity
were visibly destroyed and discarded in front of the group. In the con-
trol treatment, all six players remained anonymous. At the end of
round 12, each player left with the money he/she kept during the
game plus the proﬁts from the public pool. Note that the proﬁts
fromthepublicpoolwerethesameforeveryplayerandcouldtherefore
be distributed without compromising the players’ anonymity. The
students were asked not to discuss the experiment with anyone else.
3. RESULTS
In each treatment, initial cooperation in the public
goods game declined as expected (paired t-test between
1st and 10th round, ns ¼ 10, t ¼ 2.71, p ¼ 0.024; nh ¼
10, t ¼ 4.61, p ¼ 0.001; nc ¼ 10, t ¼ 7.61, p , 0.0001;
the six-player group is the statistical unit unless other-
wise noted; all statistical tests are two-tailed; ﬁgure 1).
Donations for the ﬁrst 10 rounds in the shame treat-
ment were signiﬁcantly higher when compared with
the control (two-sample t-test, ns ¼ 10, nc ¼ 10, t ¼
2.24, p ¼ 0.038), as were contributions in the honour
treatment (two-sample t-test, nh ¼ 10, nc ¼ 10, t ¼
2.89, p ¼ 0.010). Average group contributions were 53
per cent higher in the shame treatment ($33.8+
$13.6 s.d.) and 48 per cent higher in honour
($32.6+$6.6 s.d.) than in the control ($22.1+$9.4
s.d.; full cooperation is $60 in donations).
In contrast to our expectations, we found no signiﬁ-
cant differences in group contributions over the ﬁrst 10
rounds between the shame and honour treatments.
More surprising, contributions from the least generous
‘shamed’ players ($3 average) were not signiﬁcantly
different from the anonymous, least generous contri-
butors in the honour treatment ($2.4 average), nor
were contributions from the most generous ‘honoured’
players ($8 average) signiﬁcantly different from the
anonymous, most generous players’ contributions in
the shame treatment ($7.7 average; electronic sup-
plementary material, ﬁgure S1). The threat of being
shamed does not work only to encourage cooperation
from the least cooperative players, nor does the
promise of honour work to encourage cooperation
only from the most cooperative players. Rather, both
treatments led to a general increase in average player
contribution, conﬁrming that, even when only the
least or most cooperative individuals are to stand in
front of their peers, players cooperate more as a
group (electronic supplementary material, ﬁgure S1).
Our results show that a promise to single out free-
riding individuals for public scrutiny can lead to
greater cooperation from the whole group, as can sin-
gling out the most generous individuals. Even in this
one-off experiment, people were willing to pay, not
necessarily to avoid exposure, but to avoid being
shamed, and thereby avoid a potential loss of repu-
tation within their social sphere. Group cooperation
in the shame treatment signiﬁcantly declined following
round 10 (paired t-test between 10th and 12th round,
t ¼ 3.67, p ¼ 0.005), corroborating our ﬁnding that
the threat of being singled out as a free rider had
been driving cooperation. By contrast, players in the
honour treatment did not fear exposure; they paid for
it. Furthermore, cooperation in the honour treatment
was maintained in rounds 11 and 12 possibly because
once players earned their honorable reputation they
felt obliged to maintain it. Average contributions
from anonymous players in round 12 were very similar
in the treatments for honour ($0.33) and shame
($0.34), but average contributions from players who
were honoured ($0.55) were signiﬁcantly higher than
those from players who were shamed ($0.15; two-
sample t-test, nh ¼ 20, ns ¼ 19, t ¼ 2.72, p ¼ 0.009;
the individual player is the statistical unit).
4. DISCUSSION
Cues of being watched enhance cooperation [11] and
when humans lived in small groups, it was easy to
observe individual behaviour. However, as human
society grew, gossip, by way of language, replaced
direct observation as a vector for keeping track of
human behaviour [12,13]. At this transition, shame
and honour could have been at a premium—when
the chance of witnessing behaviour ﬁrsthand was
then ampliﬁed by the possibility that it could be
verbally expressed to the community.
Shame is an uncomfortable phenomenon, in part,
because it invites the public to join in the punishment.
Today, there are also convincing philosophical objec-
tions to a legal system that shames individuals on the
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Figure 1. Average group contributions for each treatment:
shame (red with ﬁlled circles), honour (blue with open
circles) and control (grey with open squares). In the shame
treatment, the two least generous players were exposed as
free riders after round 10 while in honour the two most gener-
ous were revealed as highest contributors to the group. In the
control treatment, all players retained anonymity over the 12
rounds, as did the non-exposed players in shame and honour.
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dignity [1]. But the absence of shaming by the state
does not preclude the absence of shame altogether in
society, especially as social media increases the fre-
quency, speed and inclusiveness of communication.
The Internet increasingly creates a global town
square where controls are harder to implement and
enforce, gossip travels fast, and where shame as well
as honour therefore might experience resurgence.
At the same time, the Internet is also a tool for tracking
compliance and for transparency (e.g. [14]). Transpar-
ency also enhances cooperation [8–10] but can be
costly to provide and its use can be limited. Trans-
parency requires time evaluating and determining a
satisfactory performance. This becomes increasingly
difﬁcult in our current era, where human attention,
not information, is a scarce resource [15]. By singling
out only the least or most cooperative players, atten-
tion in the form of shame or honour may be more
parsimonious than full transparency and relies on
social norms as reference points.
In this experiment, the fear of being shamed as well
as the promise of being honoured led to increased
cooperation from the entire group and might even help
transform a crowd into a community. The results
reinforce honour as a motivation to cooperate and also
illuminate a potential positive consequence in the una-
voidable revival of the old threat of shame: to
encouragegroupstomaintainresourcesthatweallshare.
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